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THE AVAILABILITY OF MANDAMUS AS A VEHICLE
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Law has reached its finest moments when it has freed man from the
unlimited discretion of some ruler ... some bureaucrat. Where dis-
cretion is absolute, man has always suffered.'
The potential injustice inherent in vesting absolute discretion with a
single individual has long been viewed with alarm. One antidote which our
legal system has prescribed is administered under the broad heading of
judicial review. While it may appear in different forms-appeal by right,
through extraordinary writ, or to a lesser degree, by referral through a
bureaucratic structure or to an ombudsman'- the principle upon which
it is grounded remains the same. When the rights of an individual may be
determined by the discretionary judgment of one person or one group, the
decision-maker should be accountable to an independent body, removed from
the source of the controversy, and having the power to provide relief from
a decision which is capricious, fraudulent or unsupported in law or fact.
With this premise, the following comment will analyze a recent case
decided by the Ohio Supreme Court, Home Savings & Loan Association v.
Boesch' and the potential legal consequences which may result from it.
A cursory view of remedies which may or may not be available to the
parties will be presented, with subsequent focus directed to the use of the
extraordinary writ of mandamus, its history and its potential for application
in this case.
Home Savings & Loan Association v. Boesch
The opening of a branch office by an established building and loan
association is subject to the written approval of the Superintendent of Build-
ing and Loan Associations.' In Home Savings & Loan Association v.
Boesch5 the Ohio Supreme Court held that the decision of the Superintendent
I United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2 V. Rosenblum, On Davis on Confining, Structuring and Checking Administrative Discretion,
in ADMInISnuTV E DISCRETION 49 (C. Havighurst ed. 1974).
2 41 Ohio St. 2d 115, 322 N.E.2d 878 (1975).
4 Oo REvIsED CODE ANN. § 1151.05 (Page 1968). In order for an existing building and loan
association to establish a branch office, the statute requires the approval of the superintendent:
No building and loan association shall establish more than one office, or maintain
branches other than those established before July 3, 1923 nor relocate any branch, except
with the approval of the superintendent of building and loan associations previously had
in writing. Id.
5 41 Ohio St. 2d 115, 322 N.E.2d 878 (1975).
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of Building and Loan Associations granting or denying approval for es-
tablishing branch offices is not subject to judicial review within the provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act.'
An application for a new branch office was filed pursuant to this
requirement, in 1972, by the Falls Savings and Loan Association. Petitioner,
Home Savings & Loan Association, was advised'of this application and
opposed it at an informal conference held by the superintendent. Subse-
quently the application was granted, and the petitioner/competitor filed an
appeal in the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County from the approval
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.8
The case reached the Ohio Supreme Court following a decision in the
court of appeals stating that the approval was a licensing function and
therefore sufficient to invoke the procedural safeguards of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. The supreme court reversed. The court reasoned that
in order to qualify as an "agency" within Ohio Revised Code Section 119.01
(A), the superintendent must be exercising a licensing function. The court
construed "license" under Section 119.01 (B) as the certification to commence
business. Since the approval of a branch application was merely the expansion
of a pre-existing business, it did not constitute an exercise of a licensing func-
tion which would invoke a right to judicial review under Ohio Revised Code
Chapter 119.
In denying a right of judicial review through the Administrative Procedure
Act, the Ohio Supreme Court in effect eliminates the procedural due process
requirements this legislation provides, to wit: notice,' adjudication hearing,"
and judicial review of an agency record to determine whether a decision is
"supported by reliable, probative and substantive evidence and is in ac-
cordance with law."" Since the enabling legislation which established this
regulatory proceeding 12 unfortunately made no provision for notice, hearing
6 OHIo REVISED CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Page. 1968).
7 Notification was made pursuant to an agreement executed in 1970 to "coordinate the eligi-
bility requirements and administrative treatment of applicants for new branch facilities between
Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Ohio Division of Building and Loan Associations."
41 Ohio St. 2d at 116n.1, 322 N.E.2d at 878n.1. Under the terms of the agreement, as
amended January 21, 1972,
[wihen a complete application has been filed the appropriate authority shall also notify
each local thrift and home-financing institution which he considers might have a com-
petitive interest in the application. Id.
8 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §119.12 (Page 1969).
9 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §119.07 (Page 1969).
0 OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 119.09 (Page 1969).
II Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Page 1969).
12 OHIO REVISED CODE ANN. §1151.05 (Page 1968).
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or appeal, these basic due process concepts are nowhere guaranteed the
parties by statutory law.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Boesch raises several questions.
If the approval of the superintendent is granted or denied without a sup-
portable evidential basis, or if the decision is made capriciously or arbitrarily,
or if the practices and proceedings through which the decision is reached
deny the interested parties meaningful participation or violate basic due
process concepts, what remedy is available? Is an avenue of judicial review
open? By what vehicle is it to be reached?
It is to these questions that the subsequent discussion is directed. How-
ever, a preliminary distinction is necessary. The problem of obtaining
judicial review confronts both the applicant whose branching request is
denied and the competitor who is seeking to overturn a request which has
been approved. The positions of these respective parties, however, must be
distinguished, particularly on the issue of standing.
At the federal level both charter and branch decisions are subject to
judicial review at the behest of either applicants or competitors.'" The
decisions and criteria utilized by the federal courts are not binding, how-
ever, on state courts which are subject to widely varying statutory schemes
and individualized precedents. The federal tests for standing and ripeness,"
while certainly guiding forces in state law, should not be considered as
definitive. Practitioners must look to local law in this vital area.
An aggreived competitor at the state level in Ohio, must fulfill
requirements of standing and ripeness constituting a justiciable issue in
order to invoke judicial jurisdiction. 5 The competitor must allege facts
1 See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973); Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon,
370 F.2d 381, 388 (8th Cir. 1966); First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 272
(4th Cir. 1965) (both finding standing for competitor banks). See also Scott, In Quest of
Reason: The Licensing Decision of the Federal Banking Agencies, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 235
(1975); Note, Federal Savings & Loan Law, 51 Cmi-KENT L. REV. 656 (1974) (discussing
federal and state law in Illinois); Note, Extending Authority of the Judiciary to Review
Administrative Agency Decisions, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 613 (1972).
4See Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970);
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972);
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 941 (1966). See also Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102
(1975); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Comment, Reviewability
of Administrative Actions: The Elusive Search for a Pragmatic Standard through Discussion
of the Presumption of Reviewability, Ripeness, Formality and Finality of Doctrines, 1974
DuKrE L.J. 382 (1974).
15 See, e.g., Zangerle v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 563, 41 N.E.2d 369 (1942). For discussion see
Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions in Ohio, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 853 (1973).
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establishing a substantial stake in the outcome of the decision such that
there is presented an adversary interest which is both timely and capable
of judicial determination.
These threshold issues of standing and ripeness which a competitor
must face will not be examined in depth at this time. It should be noted, how-
ever, that while the petitioner/competitor in the case at hand was denied
standing as a "party" within the context of Ohio Revised Code Chapter
119 at the trial level, this denial was reversed by the court of appeals. Al-
though it was not discussed as an issue by the Ohio Supreme Court, lack
of standing was not utilized by the high court as a grounds for dismissal.
Generally, the applicant is in a more favorable position. Once an applica-
tion has been filed pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 1151.05 and
approval of the branch denied, the applicant can allege that the agency
action is final, that injury in fact has occurred and that, with an aggreived
party, the issue is ripe for review. The primary question then becomes
what remedy, if any, is available to secure this review?
Once statutory review has been denied under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, three general categories of nonstatutory review must be examined.
These are injunctive relief, declaratory judgments, and the extraordinary
writs-also known as the prerogative writs, i.e., certiorari, habeas corpus,
prohibition, procedendo, quo warranto and mandamus. Since the writ of
mandamus will only be issued if there is no other remedy at law or equity,
a general overview of these remedies is necessary at this point. This over-
view is not intended as an exhaustive analysis and is basically preparatory
for a more extensive presentation of mandamus.
INJUNCTION
An injunction has been defined as, "a command to do or refrain from
doing a certain act."'" By design it is intended to prevent future injury
rather than to redress past wrongs." Its issuance lies within the discretion
of the court according to established rules of equity. The nature of the
One commentator argues,
According to Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 2 ... an aggrieved party is entitled to
invoke the jurisdiction of the court if he can state a claim for relief. In a court of generaljurisdiction it should make no difference whether the claim is couched in terms of
"review", under either of the local administration or state agency statutes, or in terms of
injunctive, mandamus, declaratory or other remedy.
Rutledge, Administrative Review and the Modern Courts Amendment, 35 Omo ST. L.J. 41,
54 (1974).
i6 Law of March 11, 1853, ch. IV, §237 [1853] Laws of Ohio (repealed 1971). Ohio Rule of
Civil Procedure 65 now governs the issuance of injunctions.
17 Stockhouse v. Steele Canning Co., 22 Ohio Misc. 1, 257 N.E.2d 424 (C.P. 1969).
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wrong sought to be avoided must be immediate and irreparable.18 In seeking
the injunction, one of the traditional elements to be established by the
plaintiff is the existence of a clear present legal right."9 However, a tempo-
rary preventive injunction will be granted to preserve the status quo until
the rights of the parties can be determined."0
Could an injunction provide the relief sought by either an applicant
or competitor? What clear legal right could be alleged and what act would
be prevented or compelled? Can an aggrieved applicant claim a clear legal
right that administrative decisions be made in accord with procedural due
process standards, when these procedures are not specifically required by
appropriate legislation? While there is some support for the recognition of
these elements as basic requirements of administrative law,2' they are not
the definitive rights to which injunctive relief is particularly applicable
and traditionally applied. The remedy of injunction alone is not structured
to provide judicial review, since the usual objective of an injunction
is to restrain actual or threatened action detrimental to the petitioner's
rights, and not to rectify an injury. Although pre-enforcement review of
an agency rule might necessitate a stay or temporary injunction, 2 these
would be issued in addition to the primary jurisdictional basis for review
utilized.
The existence of additional factors could alter the situation faced
by a branch applicant and make an injunction necessary. An example would
be the pendency of another application for a branch within the same
specified locality. If this occurred, an injunction might be sought to prevent
the superintendent's approving a competitor's application while the initial
applicant sought review through some other means. Even if this were at-
tempted, the injunction would merely be incidental to the primary remedy
of judicial review and could not be used in lieu of it. In Boesch a stay was
available for the competitor as provided by Ohio Revised Code Section
IsCraggett v. Board of Educ., 234 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ohio), af'd, 338 F.2d 941 (6th Cir.
1964).
19 Rupel v. General Motors Corp. 120 Ohio App. 152, 201 N.E.2d 355 (1963); Rice v.
Campbell, 71 Ohio App. 477, 50 N.E. 2d 430 (1943).
20d.
2 1 See text accompanying notes 106-10 infra.
22 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 119.11 (Page 1969) provides in part:
... notice of appeal shall be filed ... and such notice shall operate as a stay of the
effective date thereof unless the appeal has been heard and determined prior to such
effective date.
For a discussion of stays, see L.L.JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIsTRATIVE ACTION chs.
17 & 18 (1965) (Chapter 17 concerns temporary judicial stays pending action by the ad-
ministrative agency and chapter 18 discusses temporary judicial stays of administrative action
while judicial review is pending).
COMMENTSpring, 1976]
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119.12.23 Absent review through this provision, a competitor is required
to seek an injunction or stay while seeking his review.
It is well established that an injunction will not issue if there is an
adequate remedy at law." The key issue is the adequacy of the legal
remedy. If it is incomplete, discretionary or uncertain, an injunction may
be issued despite the availability of alternative relief.25 The right to a writ
of mandamus has been held preclusive of injunctive relief.2 A recent Ohio
Supreme Court case, State ex rel. Corron v. Wisner, 7 has held: "Where,
as here, an action in mandamus does not provide effective relief unless
accompanied by an ancillary injunction, it would appear that injunction
rather than mandamus is the appropriate remedy. ' '28
This prohibition, however, should not be dispositive of a case where
neither mandamus nor injunction alone is adequate to provide complete
relief. This would be the case if the aggrieved applicant sought mandamus
as a method of review and an ancillary injunction to prevent a competitor's
application from being approved. Predicting the decision which any court
will reach in issuing either an injunction or any of the prerogative writs is
an extremely risky venture. The use of prerogative writs is weighted with
technicalities and obscure obstacles which have led one observer to state
that "[a]n imaginary system cunningly planned for the evil purpose of
thwarting justice and maximizing fruitless litigation would copy the major
features of the extraordinary remedies."29 The statement goes unchallenged
here.
The position of the aggrieved competitor seeking an injunction is
23 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Page 1969), provides in part:
The filing of a notice of appeal shall not automatically operate as a suspension of the
order of an agency. If it appears to the court that an unusual hardship to the appellant
will result from the execution of the agency's order pending determination of the appeal,
the court may grant a suspension and fix its terms.
24 Fisher v. Bower, 79 Ohio St. 248, 87 N.E. 256 (1909); Oberhaus v. Alexander, 28 Ohio
App. 2d 60, 274 N.E.2d 771 (1971), Trees v. Loomis, 145 N.E.2d 339 (Ohio C.P.), appeal
dismissed, 145 N.E.2d 347 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
25 Brissel v. State, 87 Ohio St. 154, 100 N.E. 348 (1912); Central Ohio Co-operative Milk
Producers, Inc. v. Rowland, 29 Ohio App. 2d 236, 281 N.E.2d 42 (1972); Widmer v. Fretti,
95 Ohio App. 7, 116 N.E.2d 728 (1952).
26 State ex rel Marshall v. Civil Service Comm'n, 11 Ohio App. 2d 84, 228 N.E.2d 913 (1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 14 Ohio St. 2d 226, 237 N.E.2d 392 (1968) (The basis of the rever-
sal was a determination that appeal was available under Ohio Revised Code Section 2506.01);
Fisher v. Damm, 36 Ohio App. 515, 173 N.E. 449 (1930). See also Annot, 93 A.L.R. 1495
(1934) (Right to mandamus as excluding remedy by injunction). The right to a remedy by
injunction has also been held to exclude mandamus. State ex rel. Adams v. Rockwell, 167
Ohio St. 15, 145 N.E.2d 665 (1957).
27 25 Ohio State 2d 160, 267 N.E.2d 308 (1971).
2 8 Id. at 163, 267 N.E.2d at 310.
26 3 K DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §24.01, at 388 (1958).
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not identical to that of the aggrieved applicant. Since a branch application
has been approved, the relief sought will be the prevention of future ir-
reparable injury by enjoining the establishment of the branch. If the com-
petitor sought to enjoin the construction of the branch, could another
adequate remedy at law be alleged to prevent the issuance of the injunction?
If the competitor had a right of appellate review, the injunction might be
properly denied."° Neither mandamus nor a declaratory judgment alone
would be adequate (assuming either is available) without additional in-
junctive relief; 1 therefore, arguably neither should preclude the injunction.
There is, however, some precedent to support the injunction as a
means of obtaining a limited form of review. In 1888 the Ohio Supreme
Court in Haff v. Fuller32 discussed the availability of the injunction stating
that
... courts of equity will not sit as courts of error, to revise or correct
proceedings at law or grant injunctions against judgments, because of
errors in the proceedings, where proper relief can be had in the ordinary
course of appellate procedure.3
While this was the orthodox position regarding judicial proceedings,
the court went further to state that where illegality does not appear on the
face of the proceedings and the judgment or order has been obtained from
a board or tribunal by fraud, misconduct, accident, mistake or the like,
and no appeal is available, injunction restraining the execution of the
judgment or order is a proper remedy. While this case may provide some
basis for the use of the injunction by the competitor, the relief was granted
based on a rather extraordinary and narrow fact situation and appears to
be of little use today given normal agency proceedings.
To summarize, the aggrieved party may seek a practical means of
preserving the status quo while effecting review of the superintendent's
decision. An injunction, however, is not historically or functionally intended
to provide such review, and the technicalities and requirements which
attend its issuance effectively preclude use of the injunction alone to secure
judicial review.
30 Haught v. Dayton, 34 Ohio St. 2d 32, 295 N.E.2d 404 (1973).
31 The remedy of declaratory judgment is not an adequate remedy at law precluding an
action for injunction where it would be effective only if coupled with injunctive relief. See
Whitt v. Cook, 22 Ohio Misc. 254, 255 N.E.2d 587 (C.P. 1970).
32 45 Ohio St. 495, 15 N.E. 479 (1888).
33 Id. at 498, 15 N.E.2d at 480.
34 Id.
COMMENTSpring, 1976]
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
The Declaratory Judgments Act35 provides a statutory remedy un-
known at common law. It was intended as a procedure to determine justiciable
controversies with respect to rights, status and other relations without the
necessity of parties acting at their peril to establish their legal rights.3"
The declaratory judgment is not an exclusive remedy,3 ' and it has been
held in Ohio that failure to exhaust administrative remedies will not prevent
maintenance of this action.38 This somewhat unusual holding in American
Life and Ins. Co. v. Jones"0 involved a ruling by the administrator of the
Unemployment Compensation Bureau adverse to petitioner, who without
completing available appeal proceedings, received a declaratory judgment
reversing the agency's decision as to a finding of fact. In effecting the review
sought, the court stated:
... it is settled in Ohio that an action for a declaratory judgment may
be alternative to other remedies in those cases in which the court, in
the exercise of sound discretion finds that the action is within the
spirit of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, that a real con-
troversy between adverse parties exists which is justiciable in character,
and that speedy relief is necessary to the preservation of rights which
may be otherwise impaired or lost."0
While the Jones case is clearly not definitive precedent for the review
sought in Home Savings & Loan Association v. Boesch,"1 the "spirit of the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act"42 arguably is expansive enough to
provide review if the petitioner can allege rights which may otherwise be
lost. Does the applicant have the right to open a branch bank? In concluding
that branching is not a licensing function the Supreme Court in Boesch
stated that: "[T]he right to commence operations is the subject of the licen-
sing function, and whether the association may operate a branch is ancillary
35 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §2721.01 et. seq. (Page 1954).
36 Burger Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 34 Ohio St. 2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 261 (1973);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Buckeye Union Casualty Co., 160 N.E.2d 874 (Ohio C.P. 1959), aff'd
on other grounds, 172 Ohio St. 507, 178 N.E.2d 792 (1961).
37 OHio REv. CODE ANN. §2721.02 (Page 1954).
3 8 American Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Jones, 152 Ohio St. 287, 89 N.E.2d 301 (1949).
The decision has been criticized; see Note, Declaratory Judgment v. Administrative Proceeding,
19 U. CINN. L. REv. 344 (1950).
39 152 Ohio St. 287, 89 N.E.2d 301 (1949).
40 Id. at 295-96, 89 N.E.2d at 306.
41 In Home Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Boesch, the petitioner sought judicial review from an
adverse decision by the Superintendent of Building and Loan Associations. In Jones, the
supreme court stated, by way of dicta, that the Declaratory Judgments Act was not available
to circumvent an adverse decision of an administrative agency, 152 Ohio St. at 296, 89 N.E.2d
at 306.
42 Id.
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to that right." 3 How this language is to be interpreted in determining the
nature of the branching function is crucial. Once a savings association has
been licensed, is branching an intrinsic part of an established right which,
though subordinate, has already been legally determined and therefore
is subject only to operational or ministerial control? This would provide
petitioner with an extant right which may be impaired or lost through
arbitrary or unsupportable agency action.
The nature of the branching function may also be approached as a
question of law. Determining the construction of a statute through a declara-
tory judgment is a well established procedure," assuming a real and
justiciable controversy. 5 Would a declaratory judgment be available to a
prospective applicant who sought to have the "approval" of the superin-
tendent under Ohio Revised Code Section 1151.05 construed?
In considering a question of law, a declaratory judgment should be
available despite the fact that the defendant is an administrative agency.
"8
Arguably, since the approval specified by statute as a prior requirement for
branching is not an "adjudication" under the Administrative Procedure
Act, it is merely a non-discretionary ministerial function which requires
the perfunctory filing of forms and then "pro forma" approval." If the
legislature had intended to invest the superintendent with discretionary
authority, proper procedural safeguards would have been provided or the
branching function would have been included within the definitional terms
of the Administrative Procedure Act itself." This, however, was not the
43 41 Ohio St. 2d at 119, 322 N.E.2d at 880.
44 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2721.03 (Page 1954), which provides in part:
Any person ... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute...
may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under such...
statute... and obtain a declaration of rights, status or legal relations thereunder.
,sBurger Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 34 Ohio St. 2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 261
(1973); Canton v. Imperial Bowling Lanes, 16 Ohio St. 2d 47, 242 N.E.2d 566 (1968);
American Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Jones, 152 Ohio St. 287, 89 N.E.2d 301 (1949).
46 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 636 (1965).
47 If the approval of the superintendent is labeled ministerial, it is by statute excluded from
the definition of adjudication in Ohio under Ohio Revised Code Section 119.01(D). Arbitrary
characterizations and labels such as this tend to trigger results but are not sound reasons or
rational guides in the decision-making process. Absent clear statutory direction, the intrinsic
nature and importance of the branching activity should determine its status and the safe-
guards needed to insure its fair, impartial and effective regulation.
48 The Boesch court rejected the assertion made during oral argument that the legislature
intended to designate branching as a licensing function. This argument was based on Amended
Substitute House Bill No. 366, Section 3, effective November 22, 1973, which provided:
The Superintendent of Building and Loan Associations shall promulgate and make ef-
fective not later than January 1, 1974, rules governing his licensing functions relating to
the consideration of applications to organize an association or create a branch office
thereof. Such rules shall be adopted pursuant to Chapter 119. of the Revised Code.
This section is not to be construed as an expression of legislative intent as to whether
COMMENTSpring, 1976]
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case. The enabling legislation clothing the superintendent with the duty
to issue branch certifications did not provide for notice and hearing. These
elementary due process requirements were codified however as regulations"9
promulgated by the superintendent effective January, 1974. The proceeding
which these regulations prescribe is similar to an "informal meeting held
by the consent of the agency and all interested parties. .. . ", a type of
proceeding which is statutorily excluded from the definition of adjudication
in Maine. 50
Although not binding in Ohio, the exact issue presented in the Boesch
case was ruled upon by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Natick
Trust Co. v. Board of Bank Incorporation?1 In Natick, an application for a
branch was granted, and a competitor bank appealed under the state's
Administrative Procedure Act. The court disallowed the appeal stating that
it did not fall within the act. The court declared that since no statute re-
quired a hearing, there was no adjudicatory proceeding and, hence, no
or not Chapter 119. of the Revised Code applies to any other function or circumstance.
The Boesch court's restrictive view of what action will constitute an "adjudication" and
what is a licensing function may substantially effect future decisions by the superintendent
under the provisions of the Ohio Revised Code, Chapter 1151.
4 Though not at the time required by statute, the provisions of Chapter 119 were adhered
to in adopting the following Regulations of the Superintendent of Building and Loan
Associations which became effective January, 1974. COg REGULATIONS COg-7-04(B), (C) &
(D), read in part:
B.... When the application is determined to be complete, the Division shall also
notify each local domestic association within the county and each domestic association
located in adjacent counties in a 15 airline mile radius of the proposed site ....
C. Upon determination by the Division that an application for permission to establish
a branch office is complete, and that the association is eligible, the Division shall
advise the applicant, in writing, to publish within 10 days from the date of such advice,
in a newspaper printed in the English language and having general circulation in the
community to be served by the proposed branch office, a notice of filing of the appli-
cation in form prescribed by the Superintendent ....
D. Any person may file communications, including briefs, in favor or in protest of said
application at the office of the Division of Building and Loan Associations within 20
days of publication of notice or within 20 days after date of notification to competing
institutions, whichever is later. A copy of all communications in protest of said appli-
cation shall be furnished to the applicant by the protestant. Oral argument will be
held unless no question is raised with respect to the application, by a protestant or
the Superintendent ....
Since the decision in the Boesch case, the Ohio legislature has enacted Ohio Revised Code
Section 1155.20 which became effective October 30, 1975. This section requires that the
Superintendent of Building and Loan Associations shall issue rules and standards necessary
to carry out Chapter 1151 and further provides that these rules and standards shall be
issued subject to sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code. While this section provides
needed safeguards for the rulemaking function of the superintendent in this area, it does
not require that similar procedural safeguards be accorded to the adjudicatory decision-
making process.
50 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 5 §§2401-2407 (West. Supp. 1973), amending ME. REv.
ANN. Tit. 5 §§2401-2407 (West 1964).
51 337 Mass. 615, 151 N.E.2d 70 (1958).
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right of review. The court characterized the determination of the board
as "political";5" and, as sole arbiter of the public convenience, its decision
was final. The Massachusetts court further stated, by way of dictum, that
it could consider neither the quantum of evidence provided nor alleged
inconsistencies in the decision."
Natick represents a highly undesirable solution to what is essentially
a correctable statutory problem. The court applied a simple rule- if there
is no formal procedural requirement provided by statute, the proceeding
is not an adjudication and not subject to the safeguards of the Administrative
Procedure Act. This rule is applied without regard to the intrinsic impor-
tance of the issues involved. The courts should not ignore the substantial
economic impact upon a savings association which is denied opportunities
for crucial development through prudent, yet expeditious, branching. How-
ever, neither should unrestrained competition and expansion be permitted
to weaken and overextend the savings institutions so vital to our economic
health.
Properly drafted legislation ideally should provide for the essential
safeguards commensurate with the importance of the issue at stake. This
must be accomplished by the enabling legislation authorizing the particular
agency action. Where as here, such legislation is lacking, one noted author
has made two suggestions for limited solutions." First, courts can recognize
constitutional requirements of notice and hearing as conditions precedent
to effective administrative action and thereby trigger their inclusion in pro-
cedural codes.5 Secondly, legislatures may make particular provisions ap-
plicable in informal adjudications where the complex and exacting procedures
of full adjudicatory processes are unnecessary to provide fully informed,
fair administrative action. 6
In Ohio, the Declaratory Judgments Act has been recognized as a
vehicle for relief in obtaining pre-enforcement review of rulemaking activities
which are no longer subject to appeal through Ohio Revised Code Section
119.11. In Rankin-Thoman v. Caldwell," the Ohio Supreme Court held
Section 119.11 unconstitutional and cited Burger Brewing Co. v. Liquor
Control Commission,5" for the proposition that a declaratory judgment was
52 Id. at 617, 151 N.E.2d at 72.
63Id
.
54 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 125-27 (1965).
55 Id. at 126.
56 Id. at 127.
57 42 Ohio St. 2d 436, 329 N.E.2d 686 (1975).
58 34 Ohio St. 2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 261 (1973).
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the available remedy for review of agency regulations. Limitations on the
scope of review available through the declaratory judgment were implied
in the supreme court's reasoning in Burger Brewing. The Ohio Supreme Court
analogized the construction and validity of statutes and ordinances
with the construction of regulations. The court also stated: "Relief
sought in the nature of a declaratory judgment is distinctly different
from the relief sought in an administrative review."59 Arguably the scope
of review available through a declaratory judgment is limited to the con-
struction of the regulation itself, the authority of the agency to promulgate
such a regulation, and the degree of agency compliance with required
statutory procedures. Clearly, Rankin-Thoman does not provide precedent for
the utilization of a declaratory judgment in a case such as Boesch since the
"approval" challenged in Boesch was not a regulation.6"
In summation, the declaratory judgment may provide a method of
direct attack for a plaintiff seeking to construe the agency's authority to
withhold branching "approval" as ministerial, or to challenge the regulations
promulgated pursuant to exercising such approval under Ohio Revised
Code Section 1151.05. However, if the petitioner seeks to obtain judicial
review of a specific decision itself on the issues of abuse of discretion, error
in findings of fact or law, lack of substantial evidence, or denial of due
process, an alternative method must be sought.
EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
The extraordinary or prerogative writs, i.e., certiorari, mandamus,
prohibition, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and procedendo, all originated
as common law remedies."' While today they are primarily statutory, their
issuance is still controlled by many of their earlier equitable attributes.
The writ of certiorari was utilized as an investigatory tool following
a final judgment by an inferior tribunal. The writ would issue to require
the record of the lower proceeding to be sent to the court for review. The
use of the writ declined as review procedures were increasingly determined
by statute, and although theoretically possible, its use today in the federal
system is virtually non-existent. 2
59 id. at 99, 296 N.E.2d at 265.
60 The "approval" of the superintendent required to establish a branch is not a rule which
is defined by Ohio Revised Code Section 119.01 (C) as having general and uniform operation.
By contrast an adjudication under Section 119.01(D) is a determination applicable to a
specific person. Orders may be issued by an agency as a result of either decision-making
process but this term is unfortunately undefined by statute. See generally Comment, Sym-
posium: Judicial Review of State and Local Administrative Agencies Emphasis on Ohio,
22 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 229, 320 (1973).
61See generally Jaffee, The Right to Judicial Review 1, 71 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1958).
62 W. GELHORN & C. BYsE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES & COMMENTS 132-36 (5th ed. 1970).
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A review of the early decisions in Ohio indicates infrequent issuance of
the writ of certiorari to review administrative decisions."5 However, later
case law supportive of such a practice is nil. In 1935 the writ was intended
to be abolished by statutory enactment"' and, therefore, no longer presents
a viable method of review in Ohio.
The writ of quo warranto today is defined by statute"5 as a proceeding
in the name of the state against unlawful claim or exercise of public office
or corporate office. It is intended to protect the interests of the state and
may not be resorted to at the instance of a competitor to prevent competi-
tion." It is a writ designed to review misconduct, but only to the extent
such misconduct requires a forfeiture of office or is in the nature of an
ultra vires act. It will not lie to review a decision clearly authorized by
law and exercised by the proper public official.
Habeas Corpus, also defined by statute,"' is available to test the un-
lawful restraint of bodily liberty, and while it may be suitable for administra-
tive action involving enforced military service, commitment to mental insti-
tutions or the like, it will not serve for purpose of general review.
Prohibition is in the nature of a preventive writ to restrain an unlawful
assumption of jurisdiction by a tribunal or administrative body. It has been
expressly held that it is not a method whereby a party may have a second
review of an alleged erroneous decision," nor is it available as a substitute
for error proceedings. 9 Procedendo, on the other hand, is employed to
coerce a lower court to proceed to judgment in a case pending before it. The
writ provides a method of supervision within the judiciary and does not lie
to control administrative action.
83 Burrows v. Vandevier, 3 Ohio 383 (1828) (A writ of certiorari was granted to review
county commissioner's decision establishing a new road. The court also announced a
new rule that unless it is an extraordinary case, it would not sustain a writ of certiorari
directed to any inferior jurisdiction where the court of common pleas had the power
to act in the case); Ferris v. Bramble, 5 Ohio St. 109 (1855) (A writ of certiorari was
granted to revise proceedings of township trustees establishing a township road. One
error alleged was lack of notice to interested parties.).
64 Law of April 19, 1935, Laws of Ohio 114 [now OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §2505.44 (Page
1954)]. See also Omo R. PRAc. Sup. CT. VIII, §3, which reads:
In absence of extraordinary circumstances, no alternative writ will be issued in an
original action other than a habeas corpus action.
65 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §2733.01 (Page 1953).
ee State v. Dayton Trac. Co., 64 Ohio St. 272, 60 N.E. 291 (1901).
67 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §2725.01 (Page 1953).
68 State ex rel. Stanley v. Court of Com. Pleas, 20 Ohio St. 2d 7, 251 N.E.2d 609 (1969)
(Prohibition is a preventive remedy and not a method whereby a party may have a second
review of an alleged erroneous decision). See Lehman v. Cmich, 23 Ohio St. 2d 11, 260
N.E.2d 835 (1970).
69 State ex rel. Frasch v. Miller, 126 Ohio St. 287, 185 N.E. 193 (1933). See State ex rel.
Niederlehner v. Mack, 125 Ohio St. 559, 182 N.E. 498 (1932).
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In conclusion, it may be definitively stated that in Ohio none of the
prerogative writs discussed above will be issued to effect judicial review of
an administrative decision of a duly authorized public official as delegated
by law.
Mandamus
The writ of mandamus, as a vehicle of administrative review, is subject
to distinct limitations, but its historical basis and the changes it has undergone
with the legal system present significant potential for its use as a method of
review. The federal approach to mandamus"0 is enlightening in its broad
outlines but does not provide definitive guidance at the state level"' in this
highly complex area. One respected authority has noted:
The adjective extraordinary may be applied not only to the writ of
mandamus but also to the baffling procedural technicalities which at-
tend its issuance... Years of historical development, in each state, have
accumulated intricate age-encrusted filigrees which vary from state to
state.'"
The development of the writ in each state is so individualized that little is to
be gained by comparisons between states and the discussion which follows
will primarily be directed to Ohio law.'8
The statutory authority for the writ of mandamus is contained in Ohio
Revised Code Chapter 2731. Section 2731.01 contains the following defini-
tion:
Mandamus is a writ, issued in the name of the state to an inferior tri-
bunal, a corporation, board, or person commanding the performance of
an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station.
70See C. Byse & J. Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and
"Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 308
(1967); Comment Mandamus in Administrative Actions: Current Approaches, 1973 DuxE
L.J. 207 (1973).
71 Several articles have been written examining the use of the writ in particular states. Com-
ment, Mandamus to Review Administrative Action in Arkansas, 11 ARK. L. REV. 351 (1957);
Note, Applying the Writ of Mandamus, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 385 (1973); Comment, Use of
Mandamus to Review Administrative Actions in New York, 4 BUFFALO L. REV. 334 (1955);
Comment, California's Administrative Mandamus, 8 CALIF. W.L. REV. 301 (1972); Comment,
Reviewing Administrative Action by Writ of Mandamus in South Caroline, 7 S.C.L. REV.
427 (1955); Comment, Mandamus to Review Administrative Action in West Virginia, 60
W.VA. L. REV. 1 (1957). See also Sherwood, Mandamus to Review State Administrative
Action, 45 MIcH L. REV. 123 (1946).
72 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 653 (1965), stating in addition:
... no thorough-going analysis of the availability of the writ, and the scope of review
afforded thereby, could be essayed except on the basis of a state-by-state analysis under
the supervision of fifty lawyers skilled in complexities of the procedure in their respective
fifty states.
73 See note 71 supra.
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This definition was first construed by the Ohio Supreme Court in 1908 in
State ex rel. Moyer v. Baldwin,"4 where the court stated that the definition
goes toward describing the writ but was not intended to limit jurisdiction and
that whether the writ shall issue is to be determined by case law. The Ohio
Supreme Court thereby incorporated the traditional precedents which ac-
companied the issuance of the writ and required that it be contingent on
common law jurisdiction.71
The writ is limited in its availability by categorizing it as prerogative in
nature to the extent that it may only issue in the discretion of the court 6 to
enforce clear legal rights.7 There has also been required the showing of a
beneficial interest which plaintiff (the relator) must show in addition to a
bare legal right,78 so that the writ will not issue for a vain act. Mandamus
issues as a legal remedy in a civil action"' with the elements of a civil action
proscribed by statute."' It has been statutorily declared an exclusive remedy
and lies only where relief cannot otherwise be obtained."'
Mandamus will be denied where the relator has a plain and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of the law including an action in equity.8" A
mandamus action seeking administrative review has been denied when the
court found a right of appeal under the Administrative Procedure Act8"
existed. Clearly, in Ohio, the pleadings in a mandamus action should allege
that no right of appeal exists and there is no alternative adequate remedy.8"
These requirements for the issuance of mandamus are reasonably
clear and generally followed by the courts. Other elements respecting the
writ, however, are unevenly and inaccurately applied giving rise to a maze
74 77 Ohio St. 532, 83 N.E. 907 (1908).
7 See State ex rel. Libby-Owens Ford Glass Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 162 Ohio St. 302,
123 N.E.2d 23 (1954).
76 Geropacher v. Coffinberry, 157 Ohio St. 32, 104 N.E.2d 1 (1952).
7 7 See State ex rel. Royal v. Columbus, 3 Ohio St. 2d 154, 209 N.E.2d 405 (1965); Carson
v. Board of Educ., 115 Ohio St. 55, 152 N.E.2d 646 (1926); State ex rel. Murphy v. Graves,
91 Ohio St. 36, 109 N.E. 590 (1914).
7 8 State ex rel. Keppler v. Houston, 172 Ohio St. 485, 178 N.E.2d 781 (1961). See State ex
rel. Moskowitz v. Dickerson, 172 Ohio St. 551, 179 N.E.2d 48 (1961).
79 State ex rel. Marshall v. Civil Service Comm'n, 11 Ohio App. 2d 84, 228 N.E.2d 913
(1967).
80 OO REv. CODE ANN. §2731.09 (Page 1953). See State ex rel. Wilson v. Preston, 173
Ohio St. 203, 181 N.E.2d 31 (1962).
81 Orio REV. CODE ANN. §2731.05 (Page 1953).
82 OmoREv. CODE ANN. §2731.05 (Page 1953). State ex rel. Assn. of Ins. Agents v. Dept
Dept. of Ins., 175 Ohio St. 222, 193 N.E.2d 84 (1963); State ex rel. Adams v. Rockwell,
167 Ohio St. 15, 145 N.E.2d 665 (1957).
8 State ex rel. Kendrich v. Masheter, 120 Ohio App. 168, 201 N,E.2d 707 (1963), aft'd,
176 Ohio St. 232, 199 N.E.2d 13 (1964).
84 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §2731.05 (Page 1953),
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of case law that seems almost hopelessly contradictory. One authority in
this field has noted:
Any clear statement of the law of mandamus in the state courts is
sure to be inaccurate because the law is unclear and variable not only
from state to state but usually within each jurisdiction; the propositions
to which the courts pay lip service are unclear and variable, and what
is worse, the courts in their holdings commonly violate the principles
they enunciate.8 5
To realize the source of the confusion and deal with it productively while
mindful of the above caveat, it is necessary to have some understanding of
the historical basis of the writ and the trends of more recent development.
Historically, the writ of mandamus arose to provide a remedy for the
petitioner whose rights were denied through the dereliction of duty of some
minister or agent of the king."6 Petitioner would seek redress by requesting
a writ to compel the reluctant performance of the act. If, however, petitioner
did not have an established legal right to the performance of the act, the
court, constrained by rigid forms of action required at law, could not
intervene to determine such rights, and the writ would not issue. When
the performance of the act requested was within the discretionary power
of the agent, there was no legal right to have that discretion exercised favor-
ably to petitioner, and the courts would not, in effect, overrule the agent
and compel performance. They would, however, issue the writ to force
the agent to exercise his discretion if he, in fact, did nothing at all, i.e.,
a clear dereliction of duty. 7
To guide the court in its decision there evolved a ministerial/discretion-
ary distinction which promoted judicial efficiency, if not justice, by providing
the judges with a shorthand classification to decide the case. If the act was
purely ministerial, that is, the official had no choice of whether to do it or
not, the writ could issue since the court would not be exercising his dis-
cretion but merely prodding him to perform an act to which the petitioner
had a clear legal right.8 However, if the performance of the act required
discretionary judgment on the part of the official, the writ could only issue
if he had done nothing at all.8"
85 3 K. DAVIS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §24.03, at 402 (1958).
8 See L.L. JAFFEE CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 178-80 (1965).
87 See Jaffee, The Right to Judicial Review 1, 71 HARv. L. REV. 401, 412-20 (1958).
88 This is the orthodox ministerial requirement. Compare ICC v. United States ex rel. Humboldt
Steamship Co., 224 U.S. 474, 484 (1911), with Work v. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177 (1924). See
also Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet. 497 (1840); Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
89 Compare Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.I. 1969), with Jarrett v. Restor, 426
F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1970) [and] Yahr v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.N.C. 1972). For
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As with all simplistic distinctions, the ministerial/discretionary di-
chotomy became unworkable. There are few governmental functions that do
not involve at least some discretion on the part of the government official.
Furthermore, no clear, satisfactory standards evolved to determine what
actions fit into what category. ° The distinction has been severely criticized9'
and should be abandoned as a relic of a past era. It has proved far more of
an impediment than an aid to sound judicial decision-making. The primary
objection to the distinction is that it obscures the issues which the petitioner
typically seeks to raise-the scope and proper procedural exercise of the
administrator's duty.9" If the judge simply labels the duty discretionary and
then concludes that the writ will not issue, petitioner is denied the judicial
review of the exercise of such discretion which is the real relief sought.
A futher problem is presented by another historical barrier: the require-
ment that there be a clear dereliction of duty which arose as a result of the
ministerial/discretionary distinction. An excellent example of this is shown
in an early Ohio case, Ex parte Black9 decided in 1852. Petitioner, a county
commissioner, sought to compel his fellow commissioners to proceed with
the construction of a court house and jail which had been authorized by
the legislature and for which contracts had already been let by the prior
board of commissioners, of which only petitioner was a member. Although
not stated in the opinion, apparently it was clearly within the self-interest
of the newly elected commissioners not to proceed as planned. The Ohio
Supreme Court held that the determination of when to erect the courthouse is
within the discretion of the commissioners and further stated:
... although that discretion of the commissioners is not an arbitrary
one, its mere abuse, if such abuse exists, does not authorize us to
exercise the discretion ourselves by issuing a writ of mandamus .... [iut
is.. . well settled.., that the lawful discretion ... cannot be destroyed
or limited by the writ of mandamus [and] that before the writ will [lie]
... a plain dereliction of duty must be established."
The requirement of a plain dereliction of duty was expressed by the
good discussion of ministerial/discretionary distinction see Comment, Mandamus in Admin-
istrative Actions: Current Approaches, 1973 DUKE L.J. 207, 209-11.
90 See, e.g., note 127 infra and accompanying text.
91 3 K. DAVIS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §23.11, at 356 (1958) (in which the distinction
is stated to be ". . . undesirable, unworkable and without practical justification"), L.L. JAFFEE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 181 (1965) in which the author, another
incisive critic of the dichotomy, stated the distinction was more "... apt to label the result
rather than explain it."
92 See W. GELHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES & COMMENTS 152 (6th ed.
1974).
93 1 Ohio St. 30 (1852).
94 Id. at 37.
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Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel. Stanley v. Cook,9" which cited Ex parte
Black as recently as 1946. It was stated again in 1962 in State ex rel. Spell-
mire v. Kauer9" and expressed as obiter dictum in State ex rel. Federal
Homes Properties, Inc. v. Singer97 in which an alternative right of appeal
was found, and in 1971, in Cleveland ex rel. Neelon v. Locher.9" The
requirement has been ignored more often than it has been applied however,
since the writ will now lie for an abuse of discretion which challenges the
exercise of duty and not the failure to discharge it.
One reason the dereliction of duty requirement has been ignored is
that it has curtailed severely the flexibility of the judiciary to deal with
obvious injustice resulting from administrative excesses. This frustration
was expressed by a New York judge in 1815 in People ex rel. Wilson v.
Supervisors of Albany,99 in which petitioner, a city constable, sought judicial
review of a decision made by the city supervisors, whereby they disallowed
certain expenses for which petitioner sought reimbursement. After allowing
payment of only $28.00 of the $102.00 claimed, the city supervisors de-
stroyed petitioner's accounts and vouchers. The court stated that the un-
fortunate plight of the man could not be remedied since the decision of
the supervisors was discretionary. This case was cited as precedent for a
similar holding in one of the earliest Ohio cases, Burnet v. Auditor,' decided
in 1843.
Another early case which helped shape the parameters of the writ was
Re Turner,' which involved issuance of mandamus within the court system.
The court in Turner stated:
... the writ may issue, commanding the court to act; but care is to
be taken that it shall not interfere with the full and legitimate exercise
of judgment. .. . It is not a remedy adapted to correct errors, or to
constrain them [judges] to act in a particular manner. 2
The opinion expressed a legitimate concern that proper channels of appeal
be utilized in correcting errors within the judicial system and that judicial
discretion not be unduly trammeled by higher courts issuing writs of man-
95 146 Ohio St. 348, 66 N.E.2d 207 (1946).
96 173 Ohio St. 279, 181 N.E.2d 695 (1962) (writ granted only upon showing clearly defined
duty and a plain dereliction of that duty).
97 9 Ohio St. 2d 95, 223 N.E.2d 824 (1967) (obiter dictum).
9825 Ohio St. 2d 49, 266 N.E.2d 831 (1971). See also Mihocka v. Zeigler, 28 Ohio Misc.
105, 274 N.E.2d 583 (1971).
99 12 Johns. 414 (N.Y. 1815).
100 12 Ohio 54, 57 (1843).
101 5 Ohio 542 (1832).
102 Id. at 544.
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damus when in disagreement with the judgment of a fellow member of the
bench. However, the considerations which prompted the degree of caution
expressed above do not apply to administrative functions from which there
is no appeal available.
Finally, some courageous jurist defied clear precedent and held that
mandamus included relief sought for fraud or a gross abuse of discretion."0 3
This revolutionary change surmounted (or ignored) the ministerial/ dis-
cretionary distinction and greatly increased the scope of mandamus as a
remedy for administrative excess. It is also consistent with the historical
origin of mandamus as the relief of "last resort" against the agents of the
king and supports the equitable notion that for every wrong there should
be a remedy-a not inconsequential concept in an enlightened system of
jurisprudence. °10
Once it is recognized that the writ may be issued as a legal remedy
to review the exercise of discretion, the existence of a "clear legal right"
should be discarded as conceptually unnecessary. So too, the ministerial/
discretionary distinction which the "clear legal right" doctrine spawned should
no longer be utilized to shut off relief or to distract the court from its proper
role--critical review of the exercise of judgment. The court should not be
bound by the historical limits of equity jurisdiction and should
determine the existence and violation of petitioner's procedural and sub-
stantive rights as does any court of law. The court in examining the
administrative determination would not be substituting its judgment' for
that of the administrator but would review the scope of the decision, the
manner in which it is reached and the extent to which it is in accord with
basic due process concepts.
Unfortunately, the courts have not yet cast off the burdens imposed
by the "clear legal right" doctrine. While Ohio courts have been obtuse
in recognizing the problem, they, nonetheless, have edged toward a solu-
tion. This solution is the development of a body of "rights" to which parties
103 See Work v. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177 (1924) (for an excellent discussion by Chief
Justice Taft); State ex rel. Coen v. Indus. Comm'n, 126 Ohio St. 550, 186 N.E. 398 (1933);
State ex rel. Breno v. Industrial Comm'n, 34 Ohio St. 2d 227, 298 N.E. 150 (1973).
1
0 4 See Jaffee, The Right to Judicial Review 1, 71 HARV. L. REV. 401, 412-20 (1958). See also
State ex rel. Libby-Owens Ford Glass Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 162 Ohio St. 302, 123
N.E.2d 23 (1954).
105 It is a general principle of administrative law that courts will not substitute their judgment for
the determination of an administrator if it is based on substantial evidence. 2 F. COOPER,
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 665-67 (1965). See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (1971); SEC v. Cogan, 201 F.2d 78, 84 (9th Cir. 1951) (for statement of
considerations guiding judicial restraint); State ex rel. Breno v. Industrial Comm'n, 34 Ohio
St. 2d 227, 298 N.E.2d 150 (1973); State ex rel. Foster v. Miller, 136 Ohio St. 295, 25 N.E.2d
686 (1940).
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to administrative decision-making are entitled by law. These rights are
emerging slowly through the case law and although not expressly recognized
as such, form the foundation of minimal procedural due process to which
all administrative decisions must adhere. Theoretically such rights may
be compelled by mandamus.
One of the most recent and significant cases advancing this development
is State ex rel. Great Lakes College, Inc. v. State Medical Board.'° In
this case the appellant, a school offering limited training in medicine and
surgery, was notified that it no longer met the approval of the State Medical
Board and that pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 4731.19 its graduates
would no longer be granted standing to take the state examinations required
to certify them for practice in these fields. Appellant sought a writ of
mandamus compelling the State Medical Board to revoke this decision
and to provide a hearing.
The court of appeals dismissed the action stating relator had no clear
legal right to a hearing and that his claim for relief was more suited to in-junction, over which the court had no original jurisdiction. The Ohio
Supreme Court reversed, grounding its decision on two factors.
First, the ex parte decision of the State Medical Board exceeded its
authority, was an arbitrary exercise of its discretion and violated the funda-
mental constitutional due process rights of appellant, to wit, notice and an
opportunity to be heard. In so holding, the court explicitly recognized
that discretion is to be exercised within the boundaries of fundamental due
process' and denial of due process constitutes an abuse of discretion.
While the case on its facts is limited to this express holding, arguably
any denial of fundamental due process in the exercise of discretion establishes
the clear legal right required for issuance of the writ of mandamus. Since
fundamental due process is a judicially defined concept which encompasses
those processes that one commentator has called "justice according to law,"' 8
the court has definitely expanded the potential for review of administrative
discretion through mandamus.
The second issue decided by the Ohio Supreme Court was that the
substance of the proceeding was in mandamus and not for mandatory
injunction. The appellant was not seeking to restore a status wrongfully
changed but to compel the State Medical Board to grant the opportunity
to be heard.' This is an affirmative action to correct the board's abuse of
108 29 Ohio St. 2d 198, 280 N.E.2d 900 (1972).
1
0 7 Id. at 200, 280 N.E. 2d at 902.
108 R. Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1914).
109 20 Ohio St. 198, 201, 280 N.E.2d 900, 903 (1972).
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discretion and lies in mandamus, not injunction. Great Lakes College rep-
resents an important step in developing a body of law which will define
the "abuse of discretion" required for mandamus.
Another enlightening Ohio Supreme Court decision is State ex rel. Selected
Properties, Inc. v. Gottfried,"' which was cited in Great Lakes College for
its discussion of the availability of mandamus as opposed to injunction."'
In this case mandamus was granted to compel the issuance of a zoning
variance where the statute granting discretion to the administrative board
was held unconstitutional as lacking sufficient criteria or standards to
guide the tribunal in the exercise of its discretion. The court compelled
issuance of the variance though obviously it could not substitute its judgment
for that of the zoning board. This principle of judicial restraint is well-
established in administrative law." 2
While petitioner had no clear legal right to the variance itself, the
court was stating that decisions must be reached by procedures that accord
petitioner certain rights. In this case petitioner had the right to have the
zoning board formulate standards of criteria by which it would be guided in
granting or denying zoning variances. The action of the court in this in-
stance was in accord with a proposal by one commentator that mandamus
should be used to annul administrative action when there is a failure to
follow statutory guidelines or a denial of due process. Mandamus could
then be utilized without resort to the unproductive ministerial/discretionary
distinction.1"
It should be noted that in neither Great Lakes College nor Gottfried
was the ministerial/discretionary distinction raised nor was a dereliction
of duty required. Apparently neither of these elements will be grounds for
dismissal when abuse of discretion is alleged. The pleadings for mandamus
must allege facts which if proved would tend to show an abuse of discretion."'
The main issue is, of course, what constitutes abuse of discretion. One
useful and deceptively simple definition was given by the Sixth Circuit in
McBee v. Bonner."' The court stated that an abuse of discretion was a
"clear error of judgment in the conclusion.., reached upon a weighing
of relevant factors."" 8
110 163 Ohio St. 469, 127 N.E.2d (1955).
" Id. at 475, 127 N.E.2d at 374.
112 See note 105 supra.
'13 See Sherwood, Mandamus to Review State Administrative Action, 45 MICH L. REv. 123,
152 (1946).
"14 State ex rel. Dickerson v. Rike, 113 Ohio App. 228, 177 N.E.2d 681 (1960).
115 296 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1961).
116 Id. at 237.
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One Ohio case, State ex rel. Marble Clifi Quarrier v. Industrial Com-
mission, states that an unlawful order constitutes abuse,"' while a later
case, State ex rel. Shafer v. Ohio Turnpike Commission,1 ' requires more
than an error of law or judgment. A 1931 case, State ex rel. United District
Heating, Inc. v. State Building Commission,"9 stated that the writ should
issue when the exercise of discretion resulted in abridging constitutional
guarantees or denying equal protection of the law. 2 ' In a more recent
decision, State ex rel. Dahmen v. Youngstown,"' the court of appeals sug-
gested that appellant must be apprised of the reasons on which a decision
is predicated and failure to so apprise would be an act sufficiently arbitrary
and unreasonable to subject the proceeding to judicial scruitiny.
One more element for the issuance of the writ of mandamus remains
to be considered. It is the need for a legal duty to exist, that is, an act
which the law enjoins as a duty."' The clear legal duty requirement is
one both of statute,"' Ohio Revised Code Section 2731.01 and case law."'
The duty must be one resulting from the office,"' and, traditionally, it is
required to be ministerial in nature. Although objections have previously
been offered to the ministerial/discretionary distinction, it does remain in
the case law, and no discussion of mandamus would be complete without it.
Precedent examining the nature of a ministerial act goes back to
Marbury v. Madison... in which Chief Justice Marshall described it as de-
pending on the nature of the act rather than the office. An early definition
in an Ohio case, State ex rel. Fornoff v. Nash".7 stated in 1873:
Where a precise, definite act is required to be performed on a given
state of fact, it may be said to be purely ministerial. But where the
doing of the act is made dependent not upon the actual facts, but
117 154 Ohio St. 459, 96 N.E.2d 297 (1951).
118 159 Ohio St. 581, 110 N.E.2d 14 (1953).
"'l 124 Ohio St. 413, 179 N.E. 138 (1931).
120 Id. at 416, 179 N.E. at 139.
121 40 Ohio App. 2d 166, 318 N.E.2d 433 (1973). See State ex rel. Ruggles v. Stebbins, 41
Ohio St. 228, 325 N.E.2d 231 (1975); State ex rel. Truckey v. Industrial Comm'n, 29 Ohio
St. 2d 132, 279 N.E.2d 875 (1972); State ex rel. Haines v. Industrial Comm'n, 20 Ohio St.
2d 15, 278 N.E.2d 24 (1972); State ex rel. Reed v. Industrial Comm'n, 2 Ohio St. 2d 200,
207 N.E.2d 755 (1965).
122 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §2731.01 (Page 1953).
123 Id.
124 State ex rel. Clink v. Smith, 16 Ohio St. 2d 1, 240, N.E.2d 869 (1968).
12 State ex rel. Bargar v. Gilligan, 39 Ohio St. 2d 129, 314 N.E.2d 185 (1974). See L.L.
JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 183 (1965) (which provides a good
interpretation of the 'clear duty to act' rule).
126 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803).
127 23 Ohio St. 568 (1873). See State ex rel. Tauger v. Nash, 66 Ohio St. 612, 64 N.E. 558
(1902).
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upon the judgment of the agent in respect to them, the duty of the
agent is discretionary, and is fully performed when his discretion has
been fairly exercised.128
The ministerial/discretionary analysis will be applied where no abuse of
discretion is alleged and a dereliction in duty denies plaintiff a clear legal
right; beyond this, however, it should not be raised as a barrier to the
issuance of mandamus.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, does the writ of mandamus lie for either the aggrieved
petitioner whose application for a branch has been denied, or for his com-
petitor, when the application has been granted? The petitioner could argue
on the basis of one of two theories. First, he may claim that the approval
of the superintendent is ministerial in nature and the superintendent, having
denied the requisite permission is in dereliction of a duty as defined by
statute.'29 Thus mandamus should issue to effect petitioner's clear legal
right. This position rests essentially upon a finding by the court that the
approval is ministerial in nature. Given the intrinsic importance of the
branching function and the inherent judgmental nature of "approval" this
appears highly unlikely. The superintendent has statutory authority to
promulgate rules and standards by which to exercise the branching function,
and the legislature has apparently clothed the superintendent with the dis-
cretion to regulate branching activities. This discretion is not likely to be
nullified by the courts by declaring such approval ministerial only.
The second position which the aggrieved petitioner may adopt is
that the superintendent in reaching the decision has abused his discretion
through a denial of due process or has otherwise acted in an arbitrary
capricious or unlawful manner. This results in denial to petitioner of a clear
legal right - the lawful exercise of discretion which the legislature has
delegated to the superintendent and which he has a clear duty to discharge.
Absent factual allegations which will constitute an abuse of discretion
as the court views it, mandamus clearly will not lie. If petitioner objects to
evidentiary rulings, the sufficiency or quantum of evidence, the reliability
of evidence, or if he asserts that the decision was not based upon a record
at all, his petition may be dismissed as stating no claim for which relief may
be granted, since none of these elements may be found to specifically
constitute abuse of discretion.' The issuance of the writ while certainly
possible, is at best highly speculative.
128 Id. at 574.
129 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1151.05 (Page 1968).
130 See L.L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, 186-92 (1965).
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These are the practical obstacles to utilizing mandamus for judicial
review of administrative action. They are based upon several policies which
are rarely enunciated by the courts. Reluctance on the part of the judiciary
to expand the availability of judicial review is attributable to several different
causes. One is the doctrine of separation of powers between the judicial,
legislative, and executive branches, which as a general proposition precludes
the substitution of judicial decision-making for decisions properly delegated
to the administrative branch."' The judiciary has neither the expertise, nor
the time, for the factual determinations for which agencies are established.
If authority has been properly delegated to the agency, the role of the court
should be limited to that for which it is designed - review. This can be
achieved not by denying access to the courts but by limiting the scope of
review. The court should serve as a watchdog to insure that basic concepts
of due process, well-established in our jurisprudence, are applied throughout
our system of government. The possibility of review also serves as a re-
straint against abuses in the exercise of bureaucratic power.
Perhaps the key to the issuance of mandamus for judicial review is
found in these words of Lord Mansfield, who, in 1762, said of the writ:
It was introduced to prevent disorder from a failure of justice and
defect of the police. Therefore, it ought to be used upon all occasions
where the law has established no specific remedy, and where in justice
and good government there ought to be one.'32
Despite hesitation by the courts to expand mandamus to provide broad
administrative review, no individual, as the plaintiff in the Boesch case,
should be bound by the absolute discretion of a bureaucrat. When appeal
by right is denied, mandamus ought to lie.
JANE E. BOND
131 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 15-29 (1965).
132 Rex v. Barker, 3 Burr. 1265, 97 Eng. Rep. 823 (K.B. 1762).
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